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In all human societies, children are initiated into particular modes
of making sense of their experience and the world about them, and
also into a set of norms, knowledge, and skills which the society re-
quires for its continuance. In most societies most of the time, this “cur-
riculum” of initiation is not questioned; frequently it is enshrined in
myths, rituals, and immemorial practices, which have absolute au-
thority. One symptom—or perhaps condition—of pluralism is the
conflict and argument about what this curriculum of initiation should
contain. Today, however, the conflicts and arguments are even more
profound and undermine rational discussion of what the curriculum
should contain. Much discussion in the professional field of curricu-
lum, at present, focuses on the basic question of what curriculum is,
and this suggests severe disorientation.
At a superficial level, confusion about what curriculum is, and thus what
people concerned with it should do, involves argument about whether cur-
riculum subsumes instruction—and thus whether a student of curriculum
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should also be a student of instructional methods—or whether curriculum
involves all learning experiences, or refers simply to a blueprint for achiev-
ing restricted objectives in a school setting, or includes the statement of
objectives as well, or also the evaluation of their achievement, and so on.
The field seems to have no clear logical boundaries. Most accounts that try
to make sense of the current state of the professional field of curriculum
study describe a set of more or less distinct activities carried on in its name
and then argue for a preference, or suggest a compromise or further alter-
native. Those who try to make sense of the present confusion by reference
to the past, rarely go back beyond the emergence of the curriculum field as
a profession in North America in this century.
In this brief essay, I want to take a somewhat longer perspective to see
whether even a very general sketch of some relevant influences might not
provide a clear picture of the present situation and offer some guidance for
the future. It will be useful to begin with a brief look at the history of the
word “curriculum,” touching down almost randomly through the centu-
ries to see what changes there have been in its meaning.
It is, of course, a Latin word carried directly over into English. Its first
Latin meaning was “a running,” “a race,” “a course,” with secondary mean-
ings of a “race-course,” “a career.” By picking out just two of Cicero’s uses
of the word, we can get a sense of the direction in which it has developed.
Defending Rabirius, he tossed off the neat epigram: “Exiguum nobis vitae
curriculum natura circumscripsit, immensum gloriae” [Nature has confined our
lives within a short space, but that for our glory is infinite] (Pro Rabirio
10.30). “Curriculum” is used here to refer to the temporal space in which
we live; to the confines within which things may happen; to the container,
as opposed to the contents. Later in his life, Cicero described his current
work—he is on the seventh volume of his Antiquities, is collecting further
historical data, revising speeches for publication, and studying law and
Greek literature—“Hae sunt exercitationes ingenii, haec curricula mentis” These
are the spurs of my intellect, the course of my mind runs on] (De Senectute
11. 38). “Curriculum” here refers, however slightly, to the things he is study-
ing, the content. This metaphorical extension, firstly from the race-course
and running to intellectual pursuits, and then from reference to the tempo-
ral constraints within which things happen to reference to the things that
happen within the constraints, prefigures the general movement of the term
through the ancient and modern world. The kind of questions one might
ask about a race-course—How long is it? What obstacles are there?—ex-
tend easily to the kind of questions one might ask about an intellectual cur-
riculum—How long is it? What kinds of things does it contain?
These remained the important curriculum questions throughout the
medieval world. The questions for the designers of curricula may be for-
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mulated as “What should the curriculum contain?” and, following the an-
swers to that question, “What is the best way to organize these contents?”
Questions of method and instruction were taken largely as given. Lacking
our ready supply of printed sources of knowledge, the most obvious source
about a subject was a person who was already a master of it. The master
told the novices about the subject, in lecture and argument.
Through the early modern period in England, we see little change in the
use of the word. It apparently did not find its way into the vernacular until
the nineteenth century. In 1643 the Munimenta of Glasgow University refer
to the “curriculum quinquae annorum” [curriculum of five years], maintaining
the ancient Latin ambiguity, in our terms, between container and contained;
that is, reference is made to the contents of the curriculum in terms of its
temporal constraints. The questions curriculum designers asked changed little
during this period, even though the old questions gave rise to violent and
polemical debates. Though the common seventeenth century opinion assumed
that “all the Faculties of the Mind, both active and passive, are mightily height-
ened and improved by exercise” (Rymer, 1965), there were profound disagree-
ments about what content should be used to exercise the Mind.
Even during this period of violent debate, questions of method were
largely ignored, and questions about the organization of content were still
considered unimportant. There was little change in this state of affairs over
the next century. Boswell, searching around for a topic of discussion one
Tuesday morning, asked Dr. Johnson what was the best thing to teach chil-
dren first. Johnson replied: “There is no matter what you teach them first,
any more than what leg you shall put in your breeches first. Sir, you may
stand disputing which is best to put in first, but in the meantime your back-
side is bare. Sir, while you stand considering which of two things you should
teach your child first, another boy has learnt ’em both” (Pottle, 1950, p. 323)
When brought into the English vernacular, apparently following the
German lead, “curriculum” had still some way to go along the metaphori-
cal extension from indicating the container—the period of study—to indi-
cating the contained—the course content. In 1824, John Russell noted after
his travels: “When the [German] student finishes his curriculum, [he] leaves
the university” (p. 134). In a similar sense, item 39 of Glasgow University’s
calendar for 1829 states: “The Curriculum of students who mean to take a
degree in surgery [is] to be three years.” By the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury the word has changed very rapidly, and typical uses have lost any
lingering sense of the “container,” or temporal constraints, and mean sim-
ply the content. Thus, Matthew Arnold might write in Friendship’s Garland
of “the grand, old, fortifying classical curriculum.”
The gradual, and relatively small, metaphorical shift in the meaning of
“curriculum” over two millenia suggests stability and clarity. To deal with
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curriculum issues was to address the question of what should be taught. What
has happened to disrupt this stability? Why the sudden confusion? I think
we can best trace its source to the development in influence over the last two
centuries of a second curriculum question: How should things be taught?
I will indicate briefly two examples of the early appearance of methodol-
ogy questions becoming important in curriculum. The first is practical and
the second more general and theoretical.
During the middle and latter part of the eighteenth century, France—
like Russia a century later—combined the most advanced intellectual and
social activity with a rigid and primitive political structure. One practical
expression of advanced intellectual and social ideas was the school for deaf-
mutes founded in Paris under the influence of Pinel. Pinel believed that
deaf-mutes could be trained to communicate and become functioning mem-
bers of society. He believed, too, that the insane could be cured and should
be treated as patients, not kept as more or less entertaining inmates of a
human zoo. Because of the nature of his subjects and task, the most impor-
tant curriculum question for Pinel was not what should be taught, but how
could he teach—what methods and procedures were best for educating his
charges? The question of content was more or less taken as given.
The physician appointed to the new institute for deaf-mutes was the
young Jean-Marc-Gaspard Itard. Shortly after he began work at the insti-
tute, Itard read about the capture of a wild boy in the woods of Aveyron.
The child had apparently survived alone in the woods from his early
years, could neither speak nor understand language, and seemed entirely
savage. Itard arranged for the boy to be brought to the institute, and later to
his own home, where he worked to civilize and educate him. The results of
Itard’s first six or seven years’ work with the boy are contained in two re-
ports which he wrote for the Minister of the Interior.1 The reports attest to
Itard’s ingenuity in devising methods to teach the boy basic perceptions
and skills. Again, his first curriculum question was how—what was taken as
more or less given.
One of Itard’s pupils was Edward Seguin, who formalized many of Itard’s
methods in developing a program for the education of the mentally handi-
capped. Seguin’s more general success than that of either Pinel or Itard
earned him the title, “Apostle of the Idiot.” Seguin in turn had a profound
influence on Maria Montessori, whose early work was with mentally handi-
capped children. The story of Montessori’s adaptation of these methods for
use in educating children of normal intelligence and the enormous influ-
ence of her work is familiar enough so as not to need recapitulating here.
The point of this brief overview is to indicate how concern with methodol-
ogy in education moved, slowly at first and then with accumulating speed,
from an interest confined to those dealing with extreme cases to the main-
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stream of normal schooling. One expression of the second broad influence that
stimulated and supported this move may be found in the writings of Rousseau.
The first chapter of Du Contrat Social opens with the words: “L’homme est
ne libre, et partout il est dans les fers” [Man is born free, but is everywhere in
chains]. Earlier than Itard, and no doubt profoundly influencing him,
Rousseau expressed a new kind of optimistic view of man and man’s poten-
tial. He claimed that people are basically good, and if they do not seem so
most of the time, it is because of the inequities society’s institutions impose
on them. It is hard now to appreciate the amazing power of this idea and the
romantic flood that gave it impetus through the nineteenth century.
To simplify dramatically: the belief that children are naturally good, and
will naturally incline to the good if not prevented by social and institu-
tional constraints, leads one to believe that educational methods which al-
low the freedom to attain this goodness will by definition be beneficial.
Thus, methods and procedures became important focuses of attention for
educators. Furthermore, if children will naturally choose the good given
freedom of choice, then children’s own interests should be allowed to de-
cide at least some part of what their curriculum should contain. That is, the
question of what became less crucial for the curriculum designer. These im-
plications, of course, were not felt in practice overnight, but we may trace
their accumulating force through the nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
tury. One of their apostles in America, of course, was John Dewey. His criti-
cisms of Montessori in Democracy and Education are about her rigidness in
specifying activities for children and not trusting the children’s ability to
learn from their own “experience.” The story of Dewey’s caveats and quali-
fications being ignored in the romantic onsweep of his “progressive” fol-
lowers is, again, too familiar to need retelling here.
One strand of this development needs picking up and emphasizing. The
emphasis on the question how, as distinct from what, led to focusing on the
individual learner as an important variable. Thus individual differences, in
styles of learning, ability to learn, developmental stages, interests, socio-
economic background, and so on, had to be taken into account before one
could begin to specify what the curriculum should contain. That is, curricu-
lum decisions in the traditional sense required dealing initially with the
range of data provided by psychological and sociological inquiries.
During this century, then, we may see the confluence of trends that have
created considerable difficulties in dealing with curriculum. (Needless to
say, the trends whose development are crudely sketched above have won
ground only against persisting opposition from traditionalists who sup-
port the primacy of the question, what.)
One difficulty has developed as a result of the unusual concurrence of the
professionalizing of the field of curriculum study and the remarkably rapid
14
Journal of the Canadian Association for Curriculum Studies
spread of that field across almost the full range of educational concerns. Typi-
cally, a field becomes professionalized as it becomes distinct and restricted.
The traditional curriculum question about what should be taught can no
longer stand as a distinct question in the face of discoveries about individual
differences. Questions of method are unquestionably relevant to curriculum
decisions. The difficulty in admitting the question, how, into curriculum
matters is that there becomes little of educational relevance that can be ex-
cluded from the curriculum field. This means that one can do almost any-
thing in education and claim plausibly to be working in “curriculum.”
While the significance of methodological questions increased, a further
influence was helping to undermine the centrality of questions about con-
tent. We have seen during this century the stumbling, (at least), and in many
quarters the destruction of bourgeois confidence and optimism that was
embodied in the nineteenth century revolutions—technological, aesthetic,
intellectual, and political—that have affected the way people nearly every-
where on earth now live and think. We have seen what may be called a
general failure of nerve, of vision, and of direction. To know what the cur-
riculum should contain requires a sense of what the contents are for. If one
lacks a clear sense of the purpose of education, then one is deprived of an
essential means of specifying what the curriculum should contain. More
commonly now, this problem is stated in terms of the accumulating pace of
change, making decisions about a content-based curriculum meaningless.
Who can specify what skills will be needed in the future? This manner of
stating the problem exemplifies the failure of nerve: it suggests we have no
control over the future; we cannot make of it what seems best to us. A typi-
cal Victorian would have had contempt for this abnegation of responsibil-
ity and opportunity.
The accumulation of the trends indicated above—a romantic view of man,
the perception of the educational significance of individual differences, the
failure of nerve, and the consequent desire to avoid responsibility for speci-
fying curriculum content—is best exemplified in movements like those that
fit under the umbrella title of Open Education. Children’s needs or interests
are held largely responsible for the selection of curriculum content. (The
popular term ‘‘needs” is, of course, systematically ambiguous; it serves,
however, to permit people to decide covertly what these needs are without
having to take responsibility for their decisions.) Teachers are not seen as
responsible for transmitting any particular knowledge; rather they are “fa-
cilitators” who may organize learning activities. Students are not to learn
specific things so much as how to learn. At all points where the question of
what the curriculum should contain arises, a procedural answer is given.
I mention Open Education because it seems to exemplify the completed
transition from questions of content to questions of method. Someone can
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spend time researching and promoting Open Education and be considered
to be engaged in curriculum work. That is, curriculum professionals may
reject any concern with the question of what the curriculum should contain,
except in so far as their primary concern with how the educational process
should be organized leads to implications for content.
The problem for curriculum as a distinctive field of inquiry within edu-
cation that is suggested by this rapid gallop through the centuries is that
once opened up to the how questions, it loses any comprehensible bound-
aries. That is, curriculum does not exist as a distinctive field of inquiry within
education. Curriculum inquiry is educational inquiry; both properly ad-
dress the what and how questions together and deal with all the ramifica-
tions of trying to answer, “What should children learn, in what sequence,
and by what methods?”
If one considers the writings that characterize the field of curriculum, they
can be read either as fitting readily under at least one of the other currently
available labels within education—educational psychology, philosophy, so-
ciology, administration, policy studies, etc.—or they are about curriculum as
a field of inquiry. There is no literature that exclusively belongs to the field of
curriculum except that which offers meta-level comments on the crises of,
the possibility of, the appropriate activities of, the curriculum field.
This may appear a damning conclusion—that distinctively “curriculum”
literature is not about the curriculum, but is navel-gazing rumination on the
status of the field of curriculum. But there is another way of interpreting this
conclusion, one which may help explain why curriculum as a field of inquiry
seems to have been in crisis since its professionalization. There is a common
view in which education is seen as an area divided among overlapping but
generally distinctive sub-areas of inquiry, such as educational psychology,
sociology, philosophy, curriculum, policy studies, and so on. This view is
reflected in the divisions within typical schools and colleges of education.
But if “Curriculum” is coterminous with “Education,” this model is wholly
inappropriate, and any attempt to locate the proper area for curriculum in-
quiry within education is bound to produce confusion. Rather, one may char-
acterize curriculum as a field populated by those who profess not to draw
their expertise about education from some noneducational discipline.
The stronger claim may be to see “curriculum” as the field which implic-
itly rejects the appropriateness of importing into education methodological
tools devised to inquire into different phenomena—whether psychological,
philosophical, sociological, etc. These tools might provide their users with a
greater sense of security and methodological rigor, but these are bought at
the cost of any educational value of their use of the tools within education.
To use, for economy’s sake, the popular sense of Kuhn’s terms, we may
say that working with a paradigm drawn from a particular field of inquiry
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can only produce knowledge of interest to that field. Educational psychol-
ogy, for example, has produced much knowledge of psychological interest
but little of value for education. Education, and so curriculum, may be char-
acterized as “pre-paradigmatic.” Of necessity, inquiry in these fields will lack
the methodological security and rigor of inquiry in such relatively secure
fields as psychology or sociology. Common sense can offer much more to
education and curriculum than any rigorous methodology.2
What is curriculum? Curriculum is the study of any and all educational
phenomena. It may draw on any external discipline for methodological help
but does not allow the methodology to determine inquiry. Of necessity, it
will be methodologically looser and less secure than disciplines with devel-
oped “paradigms,” but this is a condition of studying education at this stage
and producing knowledge that may have educational value.
A further conclusion for the practice of curriculum inquiry is that focus
on either how or what at the expense of the other is improper. The present
fashion that elevates how questions leads to disproportion and undermines
good sense in talking about education. While we ponder how questions,
another child has learned two things where our children have learned none,
and our educational backside remains bare. Proportion and good sense de-
mand that we turn our attention increasingly to what questions and present
strong arguments for or against specific curriculum content. We have to
summon the nerve to believe that we can make the future what we want
and better prepare children to deal with it.
Notes
1. Available now as Itard (1962). The reports have been used faithfully in the making of
Truffaut’s moving film The Wild Child. See also Malson and Itard (1972) and Lane (1977).
2. For an elaboration of this argument see my book Educational Development (1979).
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